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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ARTHUR 0. NAUMAN,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No.
11579

vs.
HAROLD K. BEECHER & ASSOCIATES, a Utah corporation
DefendOJnt-Appellant.

Arnicus Curiae Brief
of
Utah Chapter
Associated General Contractors

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action by a workman for personal injuries
claimed to have resulted from the defendant architect's
failure properly to supervise contract work being performed by the plaintiff's employer.
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DISPOSITION IN LO\VER COURT
Plaintiff recovered a judgment against defendant
Harold K. Beecher & Ass•ociates in the amount of
$638,135.99 plus interest and costs.

RELIEF RECOMMENDED BY AMICUS CURIAE
The Utah Chapter, Associated General Contractors,
which is filing this brief as Amicus Curiae pursuant to
an order of the court dated August 29, 1969, believes
that the judgment should be reversed for the reasons
hereinafter set forth
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The positi()n of this Amicus Curiae is based primarily upon the legal relations existing among plaintiff,
defendant, and the employer-contractor involved in this
caise. It accepts the statements that the plaintiff's recovery was predicated upon negligence of the general
contractor and the failure of the defendant architect
to properly supervise the contractor. The other facts
bave no substantial bearing upon the arguments contained herein.

ARGUMENT
POINT I

THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT \VAS
NOT INTENDED TO PERMIT AN ACTION BY AN
2
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INJURED WORlG\IAN AGAINST A PERSON
OTHER THAN HIS EMPLOYER \VHERE AN INJURY RESULTS FROM AN" EMPLOYER'S CONCURRENT NEGLIGENCE.
The deoision of the trial court in the instant case
necessarily involves complex and bi-lateral questions
of contribution and indemnity. In bringing the action
plaintiff relied on that part of 35-1-62 Utah Code Annotated 1953, which provides:
''When any injury or death for which compensation is payable under this title shall have been
caused by the wrong act or neglect of another
person not in the same employment, the injured
employee, or in the case of death his dependents,
may claim compensation and the injured employee
or heirs or personal representatives may also
have an action for damages against such third
person." (Emphasis added.)
Read by itself, the foregoing provision suggests the
threshold problems inherent in determining the meaning
of "caused by'' and "not in the same employment."
Additional problems of construction arise from the
language used in the second sentence of 35-1-62:
"If compensation is claimed and the employer
or insurance carrier becomes obligated to pay
compensation, the employer or insurance carrier
shall become trustee of the cause of action against
the third party and may bring and maintain the
action either on its own name or in the name of
the injured employee, or his heirs or the personal
.
representative of the decease d . * * * " (E mp h as1s
added.)

3
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The section then provides that afiter payment of
expense's of the action any recovery against the third
party will be used to reimburBe the employer or insurance carrie·r in full for all payments made.
Because of many decisions relating to oontributions
and indemnity (discussed under Point III) the creation
of a cause of action in favor of the employer or insurance
carrier, in a situation in which an employee is injured
by the concurrent negligence of an employer and a third
person, woll!ld lead to contradiction and confusion.
This court has heretofore decided that 35-1-62 (prior
to the 1945 amendment) was intended to cover "passive"
as well as "active" negligence of the third party tort
feasor. In Johanson v. Cudahy Packing Company, 107
Utah 114, 152 P.2d 98 (1944), a truck driver had backed
his employer's truck into high tension electric wires
while making a delivery to defendant. It was held that
the employee had a right of action against defendant
even though negligence was predicated upon a failure
to warn rather than an affirmative wrongful act. In that
caise, however, the terms "passive" and "active" were
used to refer respectively to acts of omissiion and oommission rather than to the primary and secondary l,iabilities of different persons. The court, in construing
the section, said :
"The section was designed to permit the person or firm paying compensation to participate
in any recovery had from the negligent third
party.''

4
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Inasmuch as 35-1-62 permits recovery from a third
peirsion only if the injury is "caused by'' the wrongful
act or neglect of ·such person, and there is no reference
to contributing causes, it is arguable that the section
was meant to cover situations on which the employer
was not also negligent. It does not seem to contemplate
situations in which the injury resulted from a concurrenoe of negligence on the part of a third person and
the employer if the injury occurs within the scope and
course of employment within the meaning of the ·workmen's Compensation Act.
It might be arg1rnd that prohibition of recovery
from a third person where the injury results from his
and the emp1oyer 's concurrent negligence would be unfair because it would permit third parties to escape
liability which should be imposed upon them.

The matter can perhaps best be resolved not on the
basit> of whether negligence is "passive" or "active",
but on whether the employer's negligence or the third
person's negligence was the primary cause of the injury.
If the employer's negligence was the primary cause, the
exclusive remedy be should be under the Workmen's
Compensation Aet; but if the third party's negligence
was the primary cause, the employee would be able to
invoke 35-1-62, provided the employee and the other
party (or parties) were not "in the same employment."
Such a construction would achieve fairness, calTy
out the policies of the vVorkmen 's Compensation Act,

5
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and avoid problems ansmg out of classic doctrines of
contribution and indemnity.
POINT II
PLAINTIFF'S EXCLUSIVE REMEDY IS
UNDER THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT
BECAUSE PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT "\VERE
IN "THE SAME EMPLOYMENT."
Under 35-1-62 an action may be brought by an injured employee against a third-party tort feasor only
when the third party is ''not in the same employment.''
The provision must refer to others than co-employees of
an injured employee, becamse under 35-1-60, the right to
recover compensation under the \V orkmen 's Compensation Act is the exclusive remedy against not only the
employer, bwt any officer, agent or empfoyee of the
employer. Although this court does not appear to have
expressly defined "the same employment," several decisions demonstrate that it is not limited to "the employer,'' and his officers, agents and employees.
The mo·st recent case is Cook v. Peter Kiewit Sons
Co., 50 Utah 2d 20, 86 P.2d 616 (1963), in which defendant
and plaintiff's employer, another construction company,
formed a joint venture to build a diversi,on tunnel at
Flaming Gorge Dam. Plaintiff was injured while working in the tunnel and obtained compensation for the
injuries. He brought an action against defendant, claiming that negligence of its employees cauaed the injuries.
In discussing 35-1-62 the court said:

6
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"The language of the statute preserving an
action against ' * * * third persons' who are 'not
in the same employment "' * * ' seems plainly
designed to apply to strangers to the employment and not to co-workerrs jointly engaged in the
same endeavor.''
The court held that the joint venture should be
regarded as the employing unit and that employees of
both companies were engaged in the same employment
within the meaning of the section. In so doing it relied
partly upon the fact that plaintiff worked fairly closely
with defendant's employees and was directed to drill by
defendant's engineers. Al1though some reliance was
placed upon the fact that plaintiff probably could have
ciontended successfully that he would be covered hy
workmen's compensation as an employee of defendant,
this would not be an important factor if the defendant
were a fellow employee, or an officer of the empl'°yer.
Yet under the Workmen's Compensation Act such fellow
employees and officers are as protected as the employer.
Other reasons advanced by the oourt in the Cook case
for denying liability are as pertinent to the present case
as they were there.
The position of the defendant in the present case is
somewhat unique. As architect under contract with Salt
Lake City and Salt Lake County, it was not in any
ordinary sense an officer, agent or employee of the
contractor, a co-employee of the plaintiff, a supervisor of
the plaintiff, or employer of the contract·or. Yet, it had
attributes of all of these. Its activities were so interwoven with those of the contractor and its employees,

7
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including the plaintiff, that it must necessarily be regarded ais in the same employment.
One -Of the fundamental tests applied by this court,
as by those in other juri·sdictions, to determine whether
an employer-employee relationship exists, is whether
there is a right of supervision and control. In Weber
County-Ogden City R. Com. v. Industrial Commission,
98 Utah 85, 71 P2.d 177 (1937), the court stated:
''This court, in several cases, has stated the
principles as generally followed by the courts of
this country. * * * 'Whenever the employer retained supervision and control of the work to
be performed, no matter what relation he had
sought to establish, the workmen under him were
to be deemed hiis employees'.
"It may be admitted that the application of
that principle in those cases was called for by
the express language of the statute defining an
independent contractor. Obviously, however, this
rule is not limited in its application to cases involving a distinction between an independent
contractor and an employee.'' (Emphasis added.)

The court further pointed out that the exercise of
.supervision and control was the most important test to
determine the existence of an employer-employee relationship and said that the fact that one person paid the
employee's wages and had the exclusive right to discharge or suspend him would not prevent the employee
from being in the service of another person.
There is no doubt in the present case that the defendant had the right of superv1s1on and control over the

8
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plaintiff in connection with the work being done. Indeed,
it is the alleged failure to properly perform this supervision and control that constitutes the whole basis of the
lawsuit. It is reeognized that most of the cases following
the Weber County case involve primarily a determination of whether the employer-employee relationship
existed. However, if there is sufficient basis, using such
test, to establish the employer-employee relationship,
certainly the test should have great materiality in determining whether the parties were in the same employment, as was reeognized by this court in Cook v. Peter
Kiewit Sons Company, supra., when the court placed
reliance upon the fact that the plaintiff had worked
closely with defendant's employees, and was directed
where to drill by its engineers.
A case in ·which similar principles were invoked is
Long v. Springfield Lumber Mills, Inc., 214 Ore. 231, 327
P.2d 241 (1958). The plaintiff was employed by one who
had entered into a joint venture with the defendant for
logging of a tract of timber and delivery of logs to the
defendant's pond, the profits of the venture to be shared.
Employees of both ciooperated in the unloading of the
logs and were doing so when plaintiff was injured. Plaintiff had driven his truck loaded with logs to the defendant's dumping site and while unloading the logs was
struck and injured. The agreement between plaintiff's
employer and defendant required the employer to pr>ovide workmen's compensation insurance for his employees, which he had done. The Oregon court, under a
somewhat different statute, held that the defendant and

9
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plaintiff 'JS employer had joint supervis~on and control
over the log dump area, and that the two employers were
engaged in furtherance of a common enterprise, and that
consequently plaintiff could not bring this action against
defendant but had to rely on workmen's compensation.

POINT III
THE ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES vVHICH
COULD FOLLO\Y FROM HOLDING THE DEFENDANT LIABLE TO PLAINTIFF UNDER
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE DEMONS1!kATE THAT THE POLICIES AND PURPOSES
OF THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT REQUIRES A BROAD CONSTRUCTION OF THE
TERMS "IN THE SAME EMPLOYMENT" AS USED
IN 35-1-62 U.C.A. 1953.
While this court has refused to allow contribution
among joint tort feas·ors, it has applied a generally
accepted rule that one guilty of only passive or inactive negligence is entitled to indemnity for amounts
paid to an injured plaintiff from one who was actively
negligent in causing the injury. See, e.g., Salt Lake City
v. Schubach, 108 Utah 266, 155 P.2d 149 (1945 ).
If an architect can be held liable to an injured employee of the contractor or a subcontractor for bis
''pas·sive'' negligence in failing to supervise construction, presumably be would have a right, in the absence
of countervailing policy considerations, to obtain indemnity from the contractor or sub-contractor whose
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"active" (or less remote) negligence resulted in the
injury. If indemnity were allowed against an employer
for amounts paid by a third person to his employee, the
policies of the Workmen's Compensafaon Act would be
circumvented and the employee might do directly what
he could not do indirectly - obtain a large judgment
against his employer (finally) for negligent injury in
the course and scope of employment. Such a result would
also deprive the employers in the construction industry
of the protection and certainty that was meant to be
afforded by the Workmen's Compensation Act. It would
have a serious effect upon the risks assumed by cpntractor·s in bidding upon public and private construction
projects and would make it difficult to anticipate such
ri.sks in connection with the preparation of bids or
negotiation of the construction contracts.

If, on the other hand, the court, in accordance with
the majority rule, should deny indemnity, a third party
who may be less culpable than the employer would be
held liable in damages in an unlimited amount while the
culpable employer would not only have complete protection against suit but would be entitled, under the
Workmen's Compensation Act, to recover compensation
paid to the injured employee.
We do not mean to suggest that the court can or
should make a policy determination regarding rights,
obligations or remedies, which is not permissible under
the language of the vVorkmen 's Compensation Act. That
is properly a matter for the legislature. However, the

11
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policies behind the act and the
plished thereby are we11 knovvn
it is necessary to construe a
same employment" priovision
siderations may be taken into
the legislative meaning.

objectives to be accomto the court. And where
provision such as "the
of 35-1-62, policy conaccount in determining

There is a conflict among jurisdictions as to whether
contribution or indemnity should be allowed against the
employer when a third party tort f easor is required to
pay a judgment to an injured employee. Most of the
courts deny the right on the ground that the ,sole obligation of the employer is under the \Vorkmen 's Compensation Act and consequently the employer and the third
party tort feasor are not under a common liability to
the injured or killed workmen. See, for example, Annotation, ''Effects of \Vorkmen 's Compensation A0t on
right of third person tort feasor to recover contribution
from employer of injured or killed workmen,'' 53 A.L.R.
2d. 977; Annotation, '' J,oint Tort Feasors' Act as applicahle to employer within \Vorkmen 's Compensation
Act, 156 A.L.R. 467. There are, however, cases which
do allow indemnity and in fact third party tort-feasors
have a somewhat greater success in obtaining indemnity
frlOin concurrently negligent employers than they have
had in obtaining contribution. See e.g., American Dist.
Del. Co. v. Kittleson, 179 F.2d 946 (8th Cir., 1950);
Baugh v. Rogers, 24 Cal. 2d 201, 48 P.2d 633 (1944);
Westchester Lighting Co. v. Westchester County Small
Estates Corporation, 278 N.Y. 175, 15 N.E.2d 567 (1938).
The courts in these cases have been able to advance

12
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compelling reasons for the decisions. Thus, it is probably
no answer to say that the problem can be solved at the
point where the third party tort feasor attempts to
obtain contribution or indemnity from the employer. In
situations such as the present, a much more satisfactory
solution can be arrived at by holding the third party suit
is not justified either because the injuries were not
caused by the third party in the sense that he was the
one primarily at fault (efficient cause), or that the
parties were engaged in a common endeavor and thus
in the same employment.
POINT IV
PLAINTIFF CANNOT RECOVER FROM DEFENDANT FOR INJURIES RESULTING FROM
THE ALLEGED FAILURE OF DEFENDANT TO
SUPERVISE HIS ACTIVITIES OR WARN HIM OF
DANGERS WHEN THE RISK VIAS AS READILY
OBSERVABLE TO PLAINTIFF AS IT WAS TO
DEFENDANT.
The plaintiff was an experienced excavation contractor who was employed to supervise the construction
of the trench. Any dangers inherent in the construction
of the trench should have been as readily observable to
him as they were to the defendant. In fact, since plaintiff
was employed at the site, and was there continuously,
the dangers should have been more observable.
This court has heid in a number of cases that where
a hazardous condition on land is as easily observable

13
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to an invitee or licensee thereon as to the land owner,
the duty to warn him of such dangers does not exist,
and the land owner consequently cannot be held negligent for such failure. See Steele v. Denver & Rio Grande
Western Railroad Company, 96 P.2d 751, 16 Utah 2d 127
(1964); Lindsay v. Eccles Hotel Company, 3 Utah 2d 751,
284 P.2d 477 (1955); and DeWeese v. J. C. Penney Company, 5 Utah 2d 116, 297 P.2d 898 (1956). ·while these
cases dealt with the duty of a land owner to an invitee
or licensee, there is no reason why the principle should
not apply to the facts of cases such as this. Both situations involve neglig·ence of a passive rather than an
active type, and the principle is but an extension of the
oontributory negligence and assumption of risk doctrines.
POINT V
THE DEFENDANT'S DUTY TO SUPERVISE
WAS NOT OWED TO THE PLAINTIFF.
In the recent case of Wells v. Stanley J. Thill and
Associates, Inc., ............. Mont. ............... , 452 P.2d 1015 (1969),
the Supreme Court of Montana had occasion to review
an action by employees of an independent contractor
against a city and its supervising engineer for injuries
suffered in a trench cave-in, which had been dismissed
by the trial court on motions for summary judgment. As
the defendant architect had done in the present case, the
defendant engineers in the Wells case had drawn the
plans and ·specifications for the city, and were to supervise on behalf of the city to insure that the contract was
performed in accordance with the plans and specifications.

14
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In upholding the dismissals, the court noted that the
basis for the trial court's order granting the motions
was the "independent contractor rule,1' and a determination that an employee of an independent contractor
was not qualified for recovery under exceptions to that
rule which allows recovery to third persons. It was held
by the Supreme Court of Montana that neither the city
('owner) nor the defendant engineers were liable to the
injured employee.
In discussing the possible liability of the supervising engineers, the court said:
''The plans and specifications prepared and
furnished by the engineer, which were also made
a part of the contracit, provided that ' * * • all
applicable state laws, municipal ordinances, and
the rules and regulations of all authorities having
jurisdiction over construction of the project shall
apply to the contract throughout, and they will
be deemed to be included in the contrac.t the same
as though herein written out in full.' The plans
and specifications also provided for shoring
where necessary. From that it is clear to this
court that there were provisions in the plans and
specifications that safety precautions should be
taken to insure the safety of employees working
on the project. Those provisions in the contraet
made it the duty of the contractor to take all
necessary safety precautions.
''On the other hand, the duty of the engineer,
which duty ran to the city, was to see that a
certain end result was eventually accomplished,
namely that the project as finally constructed and
turned over to the city met the plans and specifi-

15
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cations it prepared for the city. The engineer's
real interest was not in the actual construction
but in a completed project in accordance with the
plans and specificatiions.
''There was no duty on the part of the engineer
to see that [safety] standards set up by the Montana Industrial Accident Board were met. That
'1.uty lay with the contractor and with the Industrial Accident Board.''
The Montana case adopts principles which have
been followed by New York's courts for six decades. In
PC?_tter v. Gilbert, .............. App. Div ............... , 115 N.Y.S. 425
(1909) the defendant was an architect who drew the
plans and specificaitions and undert()ok to and did supervise the erection and construction of a building. During
construction, the outer wall of the building collapsed
killing the plaintiff's intestate, a workman on the job.
The plaintiff alleged that the defendant had failed to
use due diligence in the supervisi-0n of construction, and
it had been his duty to condemn the wall before it fell
down, because it had been constructed improperly. It
wa·s further alleged that the improper construction was
known or should have been known to the defendant. In
holding the architect not liable, the court said:

"An architect in preparing plans and specifications for the construction of a building under
employment by the owner, is following an independent caHing and is doubtless responsible for
any negligence in failing to exercise the ordinary
skill in his profession which results in the erection
of an unfinished structure whereby anyone lawfully on the premises is injured; * * * but it will ,

16
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be observed that there is no charge of negligence
against the defendant with respect to the preparation of the plans and specifications for the erection of the building. The plaintiff does allege
that the architect prepared unsafe plans and
specifications, but there is no allegation that the
collapse of the wall was owing to any defect in
this regard. * * *
"At most, then, the complaint merely charges
an omission of duty on the part of the architect
while acting for his principal, the owner, which
constitutes only nonfeasance for which he may be
liable to bis employer, but is not liable to third
parties. (Citing cases.) The architect would be
liable to bis employer, the owner, for a f11ilure to
properly supervise the work; but a failure in this
regard amounting to no more than nonfeasari.ce
would not give rise to a cause of action in favor
of a third party, whose claim would merely be
that, if the architect had attended to his duties
more diligently, he w·ould have discovered a departure from the plans and specificatfons by the
contractor and might thus have prevented the
accident. * * *
"It was the duty of the employer of the decedent under his contract with the owner to follow
the plans and specifications. The supervision
power conferred upon the architect was to-insure
this result. * * *

" * * * The architect owed decedent and everyone lawfully on or about the premises the duty
of preparing plans and specifications under which
the building could be constructed with safety, and
the decedent's emp}oyer owed him the duty of
following the plans and specifications; but the
architect owed no duty of active vigilance to the
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decedent to supervise the work of the employer of
the decedent, although be may have owed this
duty to tl;te owner by whom he was employed.''
(Emphasis added.)
The principle announced in Potter v. Gilbert has
been appr oved and followed in Clinton v. Bohn, 139
App. Div. 73, 124 N.Y.S. 789 (1910); and Olsen v. Chase
ManhQ,ttan Bank, 9 N.Y.2cl 829, 175 N.E.2d 350 (1961),
affirming 10 App. Div. 539, 205 N.Y.S.2d 60 (1960).
1

CONCLUSION
A great number of considerations preclude recovery
by an employer's workman from an architect for its
failure to supervise the workman's employer. Many of
these arise out of the need to prevent the use of actions
against third persons, contributions, and indemnity, to
reestablish a ''fault'' system supposedly superseded by
the Workmen's Compensation Act.
Moreover, the architect owes no contractual duty
to a contractor's employee, particularly one whose skills
and training should make him as aware of the danger
as is the architect.
The judgment of the trial court should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
BRYCE E. ROE
Roe, Jones, Fowler, Jerman & Dart
340 East 4th South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Utah Chapter,
Associated General Contractors,
Amicus Curiae
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